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There  is  a large  literature  exploring  possible  hydrogen  futures,  using  various  modelling  and
scenario  approaches.  This  paper compares  the  rates  of transition  depicted  in  that literature
with a  set  of  historical  analogies.  These  analogies  are  cases  in  which  alternative-fuelled  vehi-
cles  have  penetrated  vehicle  markets.  The  paper  suggests  that  the  literature  has  tended  to
be optimistic  about  the  possible  rate  at which  hydrogen  vehicles  might  replace  oil-based
transportation.  The  paper  compares  11  historical  adoptions  of  alternative  fuel  vehicles  with
24 scenarios  from  20  studies  that depict  possible  hydrogen  futures.  All  but  one  of  the hydro-
gen scenarios  show  vehicle  adoption  faster  than  has  occurred  for hybrid  electric  vehicles
in  Japan,  the  most  successful  market  for hybrids.  Several  scenarios  depict  hydrogen  transi-
tions occurring  at a rate  faster  than  has  occurred  in  any  of  the  historic  examples.  The paper
concludes  that scenarios  of alternative  vehicle  adoption  should  include  more  pessimistic
scenarios  alongside  optimistic  ones.
©  2015  The  Author.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This is  an open  access  article  under  the CC
BY  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
There is a substantial existing empirical literature examining the rates at which technologies have historically diffused into
markets (Hirooka, 2006; Rogers, 2003). A number of authors have studied energy technologies in particular, including both
supply and demand technologies (Grübler et al., 1999; Lund, 2006; Nakicenovic, 1986; Wilson, 2010). This literature makes
clear that the diffusion of new energy technologies is frequently characterized by inertia (Fouquet, 2010; Grubler, 2012;
Kramer and Haigh, 2009). Incumbent socio-technical regimes are durable, for a number of technical, social and economic
reasons (Geels, 2002). The apparent stability of observed diffusion rates for power generation technologies has even led
Kramer and Haigh (2009) to propose that the relatively slow rates of adoption of energy technology can be described as
“laws” (Kramer and Haigh, 2009). In particular, barriers associated with the deployment of complementary goods – such
as new vehicles and the infrastructure to supply them with fuel – are important in determining the dynamics and speed of
alternative vehicle adoption (Meyer and Winebrake, 2009).
How well do scenarios of future energy technology adoption represent this inertia? Studies of long-term technology
futures are an important source of evidence for policymakers considering interventions in R&D and technology deployment.
While many such studies have examined the potential for transitions to new low-carbon vehicles, very few have focused on
Abbreviations: AFV, alternative fuel vehicle; FCV, fuel cell vehicle; CNG, compressed natural gas; LPG, liqueﬁed petroleum gas; SUV, sports utility
vehicle; HEV, hybrid electric vehicle.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2015.10.004
2210-4224/© 2015 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/
4.0/).
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he rate at which such a transition might be expected to occur. Over-optimistic rates of transition depicted in the literature, if
elieved by policymakers to represent possible or likely futures, create two risks for policy. First, over-optimistic expectations
f transition rates may  lead to disappointment and perceived failure of an attempt to foster a new fuel. This could lead to policy
upport being abandoned even when a technology has a good long-term potential. Second, if new technologies are required
o meet emissions goals but transitions are slow, action to initiate adoption of such vehicles must be taken sooner rather than
ater. In contrast, over-optimistic adoption rates may  lead to policymakers adopting a wait-and-see approach, since such
cenarios imply that the vehicle market is more responsive to interventions than is in fact the case, and that policymakers can
ait and act later when more information is available about the relative performance and costs of particular technologies.
Furthermore, scenarios of possible transitions (to hydrogen or other low carbon systems) are widely used as inputs
nto analyses of the costs and implications of such transitions. In the case of hydrogen, many studies have used exogenous
doption scenarios as an input to calculations of the possible costs of hydrogen infrastructure, yet few have tested the
ensitivity of their ﬁndings to this assumption (Agnolucci and McDowall, 2013). One of the few studies to do so (Murthy
onda et al., 2011) showed that the costs are indeed rather sensitive to assumptions about the rate at which a transition
ight take place, with costs up to 40% higher in scenarios with slower demand growth. Others have used projections of
ydrogen demand as inputs into macro-economic analysis (Jokisch and Mennel, 2009).
Understanding whether the rates of alternative fuel vehicle adoption in scenarios are possible or likely is clearly desirable,
nd one approach to attempt such validation is to examine historical precedents. Indeed, a number of recent authors have
aken this approach, both exploring future scenario consistency with historic patterns of the same technology (such as
istoric and possible future deployment of nuclear), and also deriving insights from comparing future scenarios with historic
iffusion of analogous technologies. Wilson et al. (2012) describe the rationale for comparing historical technology diffusion
ates with those observed in long-term global energy modelling studies (using the MESSAGE and REMIND models), arguing
hat learning from the past is important for testing the feasibility of future scenarios. Similarly, Höök et al. (2012) compare
wo sets of global energy scenarios to historic global growth rates of fossil fuel and nuclear technologies. While Wilson
t al. (2012) ﬁnd that the scenarios they examine have been conservative with respect to technology deployment rates and
xtents, Höök et al. (2012) show that the scenarios they examine have been optimistic compared with the slow pace of
istoric energy resource growth. Other recent examples include van Sluisveld et al. (2015) and Iyer et al. (2015).
However, it is also clear that transitions in the past are conditioned by social, economic and technological contexts that will
hange in future. How can evidence from the past then be used to inform our judgements about whether these scenarios do
ndeed represent possible, or even likely, futures? Betz (2010) provides some guidance here, by clarifying different domains
f ‘possibility’ with respect to scenarios. To say that something is possible, in his view, means that its occurrence is consistent
ith what we know (or alternatively, is not inconsistent with what we  know1); in which case, a judgement on whether
omething is possible is dependent on a certain source of knowledge. In this context, historic analogies can be understood
s providing knowledge about the nature of change in vehicle systems—these analogies represent ‘what we  know’ about
ow fast such change can occur. This is not to say that this body of knowledge deﬁnes the limits of what is possible. Rather,
t shows what range of futures is ‘consistent with what we know’, and what can thus be stated as ‘realistic’ or ‘serious’
ossibility.
Though differently framed, this approach has some resonance with the work of Wiek et al. (2013), who have suggested
hat the “plausibility” of scenario elements can be to some extent validated by looking at whether similar things have
appened in the past. Implicitly, their deﬁnition of plausibility is similar to the ‘consistent with what we know’ approach of
etz (2010) and it is that sense in which the term ‘plausible’ is used here.
This paper compares rates of diffusion of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles (FCVs) in scenarios with a set of historical alternative
uelled vehicle analogies. In doing so, it assesses future scenarios in terms of their consistency with our historical knowledge
bout technology diffusion. The paper also examines the socio-political and techno-economic characteristics that have been
ssociated with rapid alternative vehicle adoption in the past, and uses this to reﬂect on the appropriateness of this historical
nowledge for thinking about the future possibilities for hydrogen. Previous studies have drawn on historical examples of
lternative fuelled vehicle transitions to inform the potential for hydrogen FCVs (Backhaus and Bunzeck, 2010; Hu and
reen, 2011; Yeh, 2007). However, this paper is the ﬁrst to draw on such examples to address the question of how fast
lternative fuelled vehicles can be plausibly assumed to penetrate vehicle markets. The paper thus addresses the following
wo questions: how fast have new types of vehicle achieved a given market share in the passenger car ﬂeet? Are the rates of
doption in hydrogen futures in the literature consistent with these historic analogies?
. Methods: comparing rates of alternative vehicle adoption
The approach taken by this study was four-fold: Identiﬁcation of relevant analogies and collection of data;
 Examination of key attributes of each analogy;
1 The distinction being between veriﬁcationist and falsiﬁcationist positions.
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3 Identiﬁcation and characterisation of scenarios of hydrogen fuel cell vehicle adoption;
4 Comparison of adoption rates between scenarios and historic analogies;
Each historical example took place in a different set of circumstances. The rates of adoption observed in the analogies can
only be seen as an approximate guide for how alternative-fuelled vehicle substitutions might unfold. The paper therefore
does not estimate precise quantitative differences in rates between the historical analogies and the scenarios in the literature.
Instead, it brings together a body of knowledge that enables an assessment of whether such scenarios have been collectively
optimistic.
2.1. Identifying appropriate analogies for hydrogen transitions
The purpose in selecting analogies is to identify past events that provide insight into the situation faced by hydrogen
vehicles. With hydrogen fuel cell vehicles, a new fuel and new drivetrain are being introduced simultaneously. As with
previous attempts to stimulate transitions to alternative fuel vehicles, hydrogen mobility does not offer signiﬁcant beneﬁts
to the consumer in terms of new or different features. Analogies with shifts between transport modes – such as from horse
to car – are not appropriate.
The following approach was taken to identifying appropriate analogies. Studies reporting barriers to the diffusion of
alternative fuel vehicles (AFVs) were reviewed (Browne et al., 2012; Byrne and Polonsky, 2001; Leiby and Rubin, 2004;
Melaina and Bremson, 2008; Petschnig et al., 2014; Struben and Sterman, 2008). From these, and from the wider literature
on innovation diffusion (Rogers, 2003) and the literature speciﬁc to possible hydrogen transitions (McDowall and Eames,
2006) a set of factors inhibiting rapid adoption of AFVs was identiﬁed. These are:
• The well-known ‘chicken-and-egg’ problem (car makers cannot sell cars until the refuelling infrastructure is in place;
infrastructure providers cannot recoup investment until there are cars using the fuel).
• The possibility that the attempted transition will fail generates signiﬁcant investment risks, relevant for infrastructure
providers, adopters and vehicle manufacturers (where new manufacturing investments are required).
• Low visibility/trialability for consumers. Lack of opportunities to test and get to know the technology will ensure it remains
outside the choice set of potential consumers (Rogers 2003).
• Limited choice set for early adopters: a limited range of vehicle models on offer will mean that consumers who are seeking
a particular category of vehicle (such as a small urban car or an SUV) may  be completely excluded from the potential pool
of adopters (Leiby and Rubin, 2004).
Historical analogies were then identiﬁed that also faced some or all of the four key challenges identiﬁed from the literature
review. Several candidate analogies were identiﬁed directly from the review of barriers to adoption, since they were discussed
in the literature referred to above. A further search for candidate analogies was  made by searching for reports and papers
discussing alternative fuel vehicles in general, and for speciﬁc fuels and vehicle types. Analogies were only included where
they had reached a minimum of 5% share of the ﬂeet; examples with less adoption than this are unhelpful for the comparison
with the scenarios, which represent successful adoption with higher levels of penetration. The scenarios represent adoption
of FCVs as passenger vehicles. As a result, data for the historical analogies have also been expressed in terms of the share of
passenger vehicles2.
From this process, several types of alternative vehicle were identiﬁed that clearly faced some of the barriers: compressed
natural gas (CNG), liqueﬁed petroleum gas (LPG, also known as autogas) and hybrid electric vehicles. Data was sought on
transitions involving these vehicles, and where data was available, they were included.
Biofuels are frequently cited as an alternative fuel, and so attempts to foster transitions to biofuel powered vehicles were
also considered for inclusion. However, biofuels generally require only very minor, or no, adjustment to the vehicle, and so
were deemed to be an inappropriate analogy, since few of the barriers faced by hydrogen are common to biofuels. There
is one exception: pure ethanol cars, which were introduced in Brazil during the late 1970s, require either major engine
adjustments or the production of new cars. These were therefore included as an analogy.
Finally, the process of adoption of diesel as a fuel for cars in France has been included. Prior to the 1970s, diesel was
almost exclusively a fuel for heavy duty vehicles. While automakers had offered a number of diesel taxi models during the
1950s, the ﬁrst mass-market high-speed compact diesel car, the Peugeot 204BD, was  introduced in 1967 in France. Countries
following France’s lead faced lower barriers: whereas in the early years of the French diesel transition, only a few diesel
passenger car models were available, the French market paved the way for others (this was both because of the increased
range of vehicle models on sale via exports of French cars, and also the greater visibility to consumers of diesel as a fuel for
cars rather than heavy duty vehicles). The analogy for hydrogen thus becomes much weaker in the follower markets.
The ﬁve types of alternative vehicle, and the countries in which their deployment has been attempted, is shown in Table 1,
along with hydrogen and fuel cell vehicles. The table provides the author’s assessment of the extent to which each type of
2 The term ‘passenger vehicle’ and ‘car’ are used interchangeably in this paper, though it is worth noting that the deﬁnition of passenger vehicle includes
light  trucks (i.e., pick-ups).
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Table  1
Historical analogies, and the strength of barriers faced in each of four categories.
Alternative vehicle type Countries Strength of barriers to rapid adoption
Chicken & egg Investment risk Low visibility/
trialability
Limited choice
set
Liqueﬁed Petroleum Gas (LPG)
vehicles
Lithuania, Turkey, Poland and
the Netherlands.
Medium Weak Medium None
Compressed Natural Gas (CNG)
vehicles
Argentina, New Zealand,
Pakistan and Iran
Medium Weak Medium None
Pure  ethanol vehicles Brazil Strong Medium Medium Weak
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iDiesel  passenger cars France Weak Weak Weak Strong
Hybrid  electric vehicles Japan None Weak Strong Strong
Hydrogen fuel cell vehicles Strong Strong Strong Strong
ransition was confronted with each of the four key barriers identiﬁed earlier. A more detailed version of the table, with
xplanations as to how the relative strength of barriers was  assessed, is available in Supplementary Online Material. As can
e seen from the table, all of the selected barriers face some or all of the barriers faced by hydrogen, though to differing
egrees.
Data was collected from industry associations representing the LPG and CNG vehicle markets, from national statistical
gencies, and from report on vehicle statistics and road transport trends and markets. Data sources for each of the historical
nalogies included in the analysis are reported in the Supplementary Online Material I.
Some potential historical analogues are excluded. In Korea, LPG vehicles have reached a share of around 19% of the
ight duty vehicle ﬂeet. The introduction of LPG vehicles started at the very beginnings of mass motorization in Korea, in
he 1970s, and no good data from this early period has been identiﬁed. In 1982, the share of LPG in transport sector fuel
onsumption was the same as that of petrol, at 7%, and the sector was  dominated by diesel for heavy goods vehicles, with
ery low motorization rates for passenger cars and other light duty vehicles; (Ishiguro and Akiyama, 1995; Sathaye, 1984).
t the time Korea was highlighted as notable for experimenting with the fuel, and was seen as potentially leading down
 non-petrol motorization route (Bharier, 1982). The introduction of LPG in the 1970s was thus not the introduction of a
ew fuel and vehicle type to replace an incumbent, it was rather the simultaneous development of two  competing fuels
nd powertrains, petrol and LPG. In contrast, attempts to deploy hydrogen cars will take place in the presence of a very
ell-entrenched incumbent. LPG in Korea is thus a poor analogy for this process.
Two other exclusions have been made on the basis of insufﬁcient data. There is a high proportion of LPG cars in Bulgaria
WLPGA, 2005), but insufﬁcient time series data was identiﬁed to characterize their diffusion over time. Similarly, Armenia
as a high proportion of CNG cars, but here too data was not identiﬁed to enable analysis of adoption rate.
Note that the sample of historical transitions is also skewed towards the inclusion of those that have had relatively rapid
nd successful transitions, in part since data is only available for vehicles that have had non-negligible deployment, and
n part because slower transitions are of less interest for the analysis in this paper. The paper is aimed at exploring the
lausible upper bound on rates of new vehicle adoption, rather than attempting to establish an estimate of what constitutes
 ‘normal’ rate. However, the record of historical analogies, including those used here, includes many examples of attempts
hat ultimately failed, in the sense that the new vehicle type did not replace the incumbent technology. This includes
hose that were initially very fast (as in New Zealand and Brazil) and those that were much slower, as with the Dutch LPG
xperience. This suggests that there is no simple relationship between adoption rate and failure, and that the inclusion of
istoric failures does not undermine the relevance of the analogies for comparison with future scenarios.
.2. Comparing rates of vehicle adoption: direct comparison of market share
Typically, analysts have found that the diffusion of innovations follows an s-shaped curve, with a three-parameter logistic
urve often found to ﬁt best (Grübler et al., 1999; Wilson, 2010). The logistic curve can be used to compare the rates at which
echnologies have historically diffused into markets and replaced an existing incumbent (Wilson, 2010). However, using the
ogistic model to compare rates of transition suffers from a number of weaknesses in the context of the present study. In
rder to use the logistic model, one either needs to have a sufﬁcient time series to be able to identify the saturation point
t which the alternative vehicle reaches 100% of its ultimate market share; or one needs to make assumptions about the
ltimate market share. Unfortunately, many of the historic analogies have yet to reach their saturation point, and using a
ogistic curve to forecast the saturation point is well known to be highly inaccurate (Martino, 2003). One option would be
o assume that any alternative fuel car is a direct substitute for all cars, and that the ultimate market potential for a new
uel is 100%. However, this would ignore the diversity of market segments that can be observed in real vehicle markets. The
doption of diesel as a fuel shows signs of saturating in European markets well below 100% of the car ﬂeet. The weaknesses
f the logistic approach preclude its use as the main metric for comparison of historic analogies and future scenarios.
This paper thus adopts an alternative approach. The question here is how one can best compare the rates at which new
ehicle-fuel combinations have penetrated vehicle markets. Where good data exists on the year of introduction of a vehicle, it
s possible to simply compare transitions directly by examining market shares at various years following introduction. Unlike
52 W.  McDowall / Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions 20 (2016) 48–61Fig. 1. Alternative vehicles as a share of the vehicle ﬂeet: 11 historical analogies.
the approach based on the logistic model, this does not have the advantage of generating a neat metric of transition rate
(such as the t  metric discussed by Grübler et al. (1999) or Wilson (2010)). However, it does avoid the need for assumptions
that may  not be warranted on the basis of the heterogeneous transitions in the historical record and the projected future.
Identifying ‘market introduction’ is not always straightforward (nor indeed is the identiﬁcation of any benchmark of
technology diffusion, such as 1% market penetration). National vehicle statistics do not always record vehicle registrations
of car types when very small numbers are concerned, and data on alternative vehicle numbers is often patchy, with data
available in some years but not in others. In some cases, there is good data on the ﬁrst refuelling station available for public
use for a particular fuel, or the entry onto the market of the ﬁrst mass-produced vehicle using a particular fuel (e.g., the
pure-ethanol Fiat 147 introduced in Brazil in 1979). However, other cases make it more difﬁcult to clearly identify the point
of introduction. In Pakistan, a number of ‘pilot’ CNG refuelling stations and vehicles were deployed in the early 1980s, but
it is not clear whether this represents the introduction of the vehicles, since news articles from that period clearly indicate
that these were viewed as experimental more than commercial. Similarly, in Iran, plans to convert vehicles to CNG were
adopted shortly before the revolution, in the late 1970s, with 2000 vehicles converted to run on CNG (Mohammadi et al.,
2011). Subsequently some early ﬂeet vehicles (numbering around 1200) were converted to CNG in the city of Mashad in
the early 1980s (Kakaee and Paykani, 2013). However, these early activities do not appear to have been followed through
during the 1990s, and thus these early experiments are ignored for the basis of estimating ‘market launch’.
It is typically more straightforward to identify market launch in projections of hydrogen vehicle futures than it is in the
historical record. However, here too there are sources of error, particularly where data is only available by digitizing ﬁgures
published in papers and reports. Most of the hydrogen futures studies against which historical transitions are compared
are either explicitly or implicitly assuming that the transition begins at the point of mass market ‘launch’, rather than
demonstration or pilot projects. In the data used here, the point at which introduction of the vehicle-fuel combination is
aimed at the mass market has been identiﬁed, rather than using the establishment of pilot refuelling stations or the launch
of prototype vehicles as a basis for comparison of the transition rates.
3. Historical transitions—insights from diffusion patterns
Having set out the rationale and method, this section reports on the historical analogies themselves. Each group of
analogies is discussed in turn, with brief descriptions of the key techno-economic characteristics of the vehicles and fuels,
as well as key socio-technical developments associated with the analogies. Note that only summaries are given here; more
detailed versions of these histories are given in Supplementary Online Material II.
The socio-technical developments are described using the terminology and framework of the multi-level perspective
on technological transitions (Geels, 2002), in particular the concepts of “regime” and “landscape” are used. The “landscape”
level describes the background and long-term processes that lie outside the immediate inﬂuence of a socio-technical system.
The “regime” refers to the actors, technologies, networks and institutions involved in the production, use and governance
of cars.
Data on historic transitions were collected from a wide range of sources, and these are given in Supplementary Online
Material III. The historic transitions are shown in Fig. 1, up to 30 years following market introduction of the new vehicle
type. Transitions are also show against real time in Figs. 2, 3, 4, and 5.
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Fig. 2. LPG and CNG transitions.
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.1. LPG and CNG transitions
Both CNG and LPG have been used sporadically as a vehicle fuel for over a century. However, it is only since the 1970s
hat these fuels started to penetrate vehicle markets at signiﬁcant market shares (adoption patterns show in Fig. 2).
.1.1. Key techno-economic characteristics
As previously noted, both CNG and LPG are used in internal combustion engines, and can be retroﬁtted on existing
etrol or diesel vehicles, signiﬁcantly facilitating rapid adoption. Furthermore, both fuels are widely used for non-transport
urposes, and there is thus a large existing network of production and distribution facilities. Construction of infrastructure
or adoption of these fuels in the transport sector is thus much less challenging than it would be for fuels that have not been
idely used.
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Fig. 4. Adoption of pure-ethanol cars in Brazil.Fig. 5. Hybrid vehicle diffusion in Japan.
3.1.2. Landscape and regime developments
CNG and LPG have been promoted by national governments—often for reasons of energy security. In Argentina for exam-
ple, domestic national gas reserves provided a strong rationale for public support for adoption of natural gas, particularly
following the country’s default and currency devaluation, which substantially raised the cost of oil imports. Similarly, New
Zealand’s attempt to manage a transition to natural gas vehicles in the 1980s was  inspired by the oil crises of the 1970s,
and achieved rapid conversion of cars reaching around 10% of the ﬂeet within a decade. Local governments (e.g. Karachi)
have also provided support, because of the reduced emissions of air pollutants from CNG and LPG as compared with petrol
or diesel. A summary of the regime-level (including policy) and landscape conditions and developments underpinning each
example is shown in Table 2.
3.2. Diesel fuel for private carsDiesel as a fuel for passenger cars was launched in France in 1967, with the introduction of the Peugeot 204BD. The
subsequent market growth of diesel cars is shown in Fig. 3.
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Table  2
Summary of regime and landscape developments and conditions of each of the CNG and LPG historical analogies.
Key policy and other regime-level developments Key landscape developments and conditions
Argentina CNG Signiﬁcant policy support in the form of price controls; enacted in
order to improve security of supply and reduce the import
dependence
Financial crisis and devaluation of the Argentine Peso;
discovery of domestic gas resources
Pakistan CNG Signiﬁcant policy support through preferential pricing and support
for infrastructure; enacted in order to improve security of supply
and  reduce the import dependence. Urban air quality has also been
an  important policy driver
Pakistan has some domestic natural gas reserves, but is
strongly dependent on imports for oil products.
Iran  CNG Strong policy support in the form of subsidised gas supply, and
generous support for vehicle conversions. The policy has been
justiﬁed on the basis of severe petrol shortages, fostered by high
petrol subsidies, in the presence of limited reﬁnery capacity; in
addition to the unmanageable costs to government of petrol
subsidies, and political difﬁculties of subsidy reform
Imposition of trade sanctions by the international
community has exacerbated an existing constraint on
domestic reﬁnery capacity expansion, resulting in severe
petrol shortages; enormous domestic gas resources
New  Zealand CNG Very strong policy support (subsidies for both fuel and conversion)
was  introduced in the wake of the oil crisis and discovery of
domestic natural gas. Conﬁdence in conversions fell as many were
of  low quality; policy support was  removed as oil prices fell and
costs to government mounted
Oil crises of the 1970s; discovery of domestic gas
resources. Subsequent decline in oil price contributed to
policy withdrawal
Netherlands LPG Initiated as a result of price advantage of LPG, which was  produced
as a by-product from reﬁneries. Later policy support, in the 1980s,
was  justiﬁed by the need to protect Dutch business investments in
the LPG sector
Surplus LPG production from reﬁneries and the natural gas
industry; 1957 Suez crisis a major boost to LPG demand;
later oil crises also stimulated LPG vehicle demand
Lithuania LPG Reduced rates of fuel duty for LPG No major landscape developments
Poland LPG Tax exemptions for LPG have encouraged adoption No major landscape developments
Turkey LPG Turkey’s LPG boom occurred as a result of the tax exemption for
LPG, which was initiated for use of LPG as a domestic heating and
cooking fuel, not initially for transport. Commentators suggest this
does not stem from a co-ordinated effort to promote LPG as a
No major landscape developments
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avehicle fuel, but is instead a product of policy inconsistency across
sectors
.2.1. Techno-economic characteristics
Since diesel fuel is relatively widely available for heavy goods vehicles, the barriers posed from an infrastructure per-
pective are relatively low. Key barriers for early diesel adoption are: the limited range of vehicle models; the perception
f consumers that diesel was a fuel not for cars but for heavy duty vehicles; and the investment risks for car manufactur-
rs, in light of uncertainties about consumer acceptance of diesel cars. Diesel engine technology was well known, and the
echnological adaptations required for introducing diesel as a mass-market private car technology were relatively
low (particularly when compared with the technological challenges of introducing hydrogen fuel cells). Diesel vehicles
re more expensive than their petrol counterparts of similar size and class, but they are more efﬁcient, which typically
esults in lower running costs.
.2.2. Landscape and regime developments
Preferential taxation of diesel fuel – introduced for a number of reasons (discussed in the Supplementary material) –
layed an important role in the promotion of diesel cars. Government support for diesel has arisen for a variety of reasons,
ncluding the higher efﬁciency of diesel cars, and the relative comparative advantage of French and European vehicle man-
facturers in diesel technologies. It has also been suggested that landscape developments were important for the French
romotion of diesel vehicles (particularly a surplus middle-distillates of oil, which emerged from the late 1960s as France
egan to switch away from oil as a heating and power generation fuel; see the Supplementary material for further details,
nd relevant references).
.3. Pure bioethanol in Brazil
The late 1970s and early 1980s saw rapid adoption of pure ethanol cars in Brazil, alongside the development of consid-
rable refuelling infrastructure (see Fig. 4).
.3.1. Techno-economic characteristics
Pure ethanol cannot be used in a petrol engine without substantial adjustments, though such conversion is possible. Theasic internal combustion engine technology is very similar, and few changes need to be made to manufacturing plant to
roduce pure-ethanol cars. This meant that substantial new investments in car production were not required. The costs of
uch vehicles are not signiﬁcantly different than for petrol cars. Refuelling stations also need to be adapted to safely store
nd handle pure ethanol.
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Table  3
Summary of the future scenarios included in the analysis.
Type of Study Studies included
Stakeholder process HyWays (2008); McKinsey (2010); NHA (2009)
Exogenous input into further analysis Almansoori and Shah (2009); Ball et al. (2007); Lin et al. (2008)
Hydrogen transition model Greene et al. (2007) Keles et al. (2008); Leaver et al. (2009)
Energy system optimisation model Bahn et al. (2013); Contaldi et al. (2008); Endo (2007); Martens et al. (2006);
McCollum et al. (2012); Rits et al. (2003); Strachan et al. (2009); Tseng et al. (2005);
Winskel et al. (2008)
3.3.2. Landscape and regime developments
The landscape conditions for Brazil’s push to adopt pure ethanol vehicles are striking: in the late 1970s, the oil price rose
rapidly, creating severe pressure on the country’s balance of payments. At the same time, global prices for one of Brazil’s
major exports (sugar) had crashed, further exacerbating the economic problem.
The Brazilian government, which at the time was  a military dictatorship, initiated very strong support for conversion to
pure ethanol vehicles. Ethanol was seen as a route to energy independence, and ultimately also export markets and industrial
strength. Policy support included fuel price ﬁxing and subsidies for ethanol production facilities. Fuel distribution was in the
hands of a state-owned monopoly (Petrobras), which initiated construction of large numbers of ethanol refuelling stations.
The costs to government of maintaining this programme were estimated at 17% of the Brazilian government’s 1983 budget
(Sathaye et al., 1989).
Subsequent landscape and regime developments led to the withdrawal of state support for pure ethanol cars, including:
slower than anticipated technological improvements and cost reductions in ethanol technologies; ethanol shortages that
damaged consumer conﬁdence; global falls in oil prices.
3.4. Hybrid electric vehicles in Japan
Hybrid electric vehicles were launched by Toyota and Honda in the late 1990s. The pattern of growth is shown in Fig. 5.
3.4.1. Techno-economic characteristics
Hybrid electric vehicles are more expensive than their non-hybrid counterparts, but the running costs are lower, mak-
ing them attractive when fuel prices are high, and for those motorists with high annual mileage. There is no additional
infrastructure required for refuelling. However, hybrids represent signiﬁcant changes to the vehicle powertrain, and the
introduction of hybrids required substantial investments in manufacturing plant.
3.4.2. Landscape and regime developments
Hybrid electric vehicles entered the market at a time when concerns about climate change were rising rapidly; and
subsequently, high oil prices resulted in consumers making substantial shifts away from ‘gas guzzling’ models. Automotive
manufacturers globally were quick to follow the lead taken by Toyota and Honda, and the range of manufacturers producing
hybrids, and the range of vehicle models, has risen. However, consumers still have a relatively narrow range of hybrid
models from which to choose (US data show 32 models available in 2010, compared to many hundreds of non-hybrid
models). Policymakers have also provided incentives for adoption of hybrids, including both purchase tax incentives, and
preferential parking and road pricing policies.
4. Rates of hydrogen transition in the literature
Having discussed the historical analogies, this section now turns to the hydrogen FCV adoption scenarios. A wide variety
of approaches have been used to construct descriptions of the future of hydrogen vehicles. Though all of these are described
here as ‘scenarios’ – since they provide depictions of futures thought to be possible – they differ in their methodological
underpinnings, and in the sources of knowledge on which they are based. None of the studies examined described itself as a
forecast. However, such differences between scenario studies – in methodological approaches, levels of detail and motivating
objective – are often lost outside the relevant research communities that produce them (Loftus et al., 2015). Despite the
diverse methodological origins, examining this body of scenarios as a whole is useful because these scenarios represent the
collective published view of the possibility space for hydrogen vehicle adoption.
Rates of hydrogen vehicle adoption from four types of futures study were examined (the studies included for each of the
four types is shown in Table 3):1 Studies in which a fuel cell vehicle penetration scenario is developed as a result of a stakeholder process. These draw
on a wide and diverse body of knowledge and expectations, often backed up by some formal quantitative analysis. As
such, they embody a diversity of sources of knowledge, including subjective beliefs built on personal and professional
experiences alongside formal analytic processes. As contributions to the policy discourse, they are also emblematic of the
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odels (red tramlines). (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
‘futures work’ (McDowall, 2012; Pollock and Williams, 2010) of key innovation system actors, who  have strong interests
in articulating a credible and optimistic view of the future of hydrogen.
 Studies in which an assumed trajectory of FCV adoption is used as an analytic input into further analysis, such as for
analysis of the costs of hydrogen infrastructure development. One might expect that considerably less analytic thought
has gone into such scenarios as compared with the ﬁrst category, since these scenarios are simply starting assumptions
for more detailed analysis. In the studies examined here, the assumed adoption scenarios are statements about the future
that are presented as possible, but without any explicit justiﬁcation for why they might be thought to be possible.
 Studies in which the diffusion of hydrogen vehicles is projected through a dedicated hydrogen transition model. These
scenarios have been developed by analysts seeking to represent the key processes driving a transition to a hydrogen-fuelled
transportation system, using an agent-based model (Keles et al., 2008), a system-dynamics model (Leaver et al., 2009), and
non-linear optimisation (Greene et al., 2007). They share a focus on modelling the processes by which increasing returns to
adoption3 enables a self-sustaining transition to emerge. They represent attempts to capture the most signiﬁcant dynamics
of AFV transitions within a formal modelling framework.
 Studies in which the adoption of fuel cell vehicles is projected by an energy systems optimisation model (ESOM), such as
MARKAL/TIMES. These models take the perspective of a single social planner, optimising the energy system (including the
deployment of fuel cell vehicles, and hydrogen demand and supply) to meet policy targets.
The range of studies is shown in Fig. 6. From 20 studies, 24 scenarios are compared. Most are national-scale studies though
wo are from a US State (California (Lin et al., 2008; McCollum et al., 2012)) and two for the EU (HyWays, 2008; McKinsey,
010) are included. Several studies contained more than one scenario, however in many cases only sufﬁcient results were
vailable from a single scenario for estimation of market penetration of hydrogen vehicles over time.
It is interesting to observe that scenarios produced by energy system optimisation models (ESOMs) tend to be the most
apid. This can partly be explained by the formulation of ESOMs, which tend to represent consumers as having homogenous
references, operating under perfect foresight and with cost-optimisation as the sole decision criterion. This gives such
odels a tendency to rapidly deploy a cost-effective technology. In contrast, the scenarios developed through stakeholder
rocesses reﬂect the accumulated experience and insights of a body of people some of whom have been involved in bringing
ew vehicle technologies to market. These tend to be among the more gradual transitions.
. Results: comparison of transition rates in historical analogies and hydrogen futures
A comparison of the hydrogen futures and historic analogies is shown graphically in Fig. 7. The ﬁgure shows the historic
nalogies with the fastest diffusion, since it is this upper bound – the fastest historic examples – that are of principal interest
n determining a plausible upper bound on alternative fuel futures. These upper bounds are compared with the minimum,
aximum, and quartiles for the range of hydrogen futures, through the use of box-and-whisker plots.
3 As increasing numbers of users adopt a new vehicle technology, the attractiveness of that technology to others increases, because of increased visibility,
rowing infrastructure and greater provision of associated maintenance services, reduced capital costs associated with learning-by-doing, among other
actors. These are forces are known collectively as resulting in ‘increasing returns to adoption’.
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median, while the whiskers show the minima and maxima. Lines show the fastest historical analogues in each group.
Several key points can be seen from this ﬁgure. First, the maximum penetration from historical examples is well below the
maximum from the futures literature. Around a quarter of the hydrogen futures depict transitions that occur more rapidly
than has previously been experienced for a switch to a new vehicle/fuel type. These very fast scenarios are largely derived
from energy system optimisation models, which have a well-known tendency to rapid technology deployment (Jaccard
et al., 2003).
The chart also shows the exceptional nature of Brazil’s attempt to make a transition to pure-ethanol cars. Unlike the
CNG/LPG transitions, all of which relied to some extent on after-market vehicle conversion and bi-fuel operation, the Brazilian
case largely relied on new vehicles running only on ethanol.
The bulk of scenarios examined – and the median scenario – does fall within the range of historical precedents. However,
with the notable exception of Brazil, all of the rapid transitions involved signiﬁcant after-market conversion and bi-fuel
operation.
Only one of the hydrogen futures examined (one of the HyWays scenarios, developed on the basis of stakeholder input as
well as quantitative analysis) takes place more slowly than the adoption of hybrid electric vehicles in Japan, which is the most
successful market for hybrids. Despite hybrid electric cars generally being seen as a commercial and technological success,
and one for which no infrastructure adjustment was  necessary, their uptake has been slower than almost all hydrogen
futures examined.
6. Discussion and conclusions
6.1. Lessons for hydrogen from the past
The historical precedents for alternative fuel vehicle adoption suggest – as shown in Fig. 7 – that scenarios for the future
of hydrogen have tended to be optimistic about the rate at which vehicle adoption might take place.
This optimism appears particularly acute when one considers that none of the historical transitions examined faced
barriers as substantial as those facing the development of a hydrogen FCV system. In particular:
• Some existing distribution facilities existed before market entry for most of the examples. Diesel was  available in a portion
of ﬁlling stations in France before diesel engines became widespread in passenger cars, signiﬁcantly reducing the infras-
tructure burden; countries adopting CNG vehicles had existing distribution infrastructures for natural gas for residential
and service sector consumption; LPG is widely distributed as a fuel for cooking and heating in most of the countries in which
LPG has become widely adopted. Ethanol blends had been promoted in Brazil prior to the introduction of pure ethanol
vehicles, and as a result an existing ethanol production and distribution infrastructure was widespread (though new ded-
icated fuel pumps were required for pure ethanol cars). For hybrid electric vehicles, of course, no new fuel distribution
facilities were required.
• In countries adopting CNG and LPG, a large portion of these vehicles are relatively cheap retroﬁts. This means that a wide
variety of vehicle models was available to potential consumers. Furthermore, conversion means that rapid adoption can
take place without retiring existing vehicles before they reach the end of their useful lives. Finally, the costs to consumers of
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adoption are low (conversion costs much less than buying a new vehicle outright) and relatively low risk, since conversions
need not be permanent.
Many CNG and LPG vehicles are bi-fuelled, able to run on both petrol and the alternative fuel, considerably reducing the
barriers to adoption in the face of limited alternative fuel ﬁlling stations.
All of the transitions involved the use of internal combustion engine technology that was  well understood and mass-
produced at the time at which ‘market launch’ occurred. The changes implied by these transitions for upstream
manufacturing capacity were limited in many of the cases, suggesting relatively low investment risks for automotive
manufacturers. Diesel cars in France required the development of new manufacturing plants for diesel passenger cars, but
the mass-production of diesel engines was well established. For ethanol vehicles in Brazil, existing manufacturing plants
were used to produce pure-ethanol vehicles with minimal disruption. The exception is hybrid electric vehicles, for which
new manufacturing capacity, involving new technology, was required to produce the new vehicles.
Only one transition – the Brazilian attempt to foster pure-ethanol vehicles – involved rapid adoption in the face of
roduction of new vehicles and the necessary construction of distribution and ﬁlling station infrastructure for a new fuel.
he particular nature of the governance arrangements (nationally owned fuel distribution company under a military gov-
rnment), the global economic circumstances (sugar market collapse, oil price crisis), and the scale of costs required to
chieve such a rapid transition are striking. Ultimately, the scale of resources required to support this transition was  judged
nsustainable, and support was withdrawn.
.2. Rapid technology transitions: what do scenarios need to explain?
The hydrogen futures examined emphasise the technical and economic dimensions of socio-technical change. Most are
erived from formal quantitative simulation or optimisation models, and most others are at least informed by such models.
hese studies put in the foreground the techno-economics of vehicle adoption and choice: costs, stock turn-over rates,
ehicle efﬁciencies and so on. However, the historic examples of the fastest transitions suggest that typically it is unusual
olitical and social circumstances – often associated with landscape-level developments – that underpin rapid transitions.
n the cases of Argentina and Iran, it was a sudden currency devaluation and severe economic sanctions, respectively, that
nabled rapid adoption of CNG. In Brazil, it was the exposure to oil price shocks and sugar price volatility.
What becomes interesting in scenarios of rapid alternative fuel transitions is thus not only the techno-economics, but
he politics and social dynamics: what kinds of political and social circumstances are required for, or implied by, scenarios of
apid hydrogen adoption? Under what circumstances might the political legitimacy of an attempt to transform road transport
ith advanced fuel cell vehicles be achieved? These questions are rarely asked in scenarios that depict quantitative projec-
ions of hydrogen transitions. However, they shift the burden of plausibility in such scenarios: how can scenarios of rapid
ransition explain themselves in socio-political terms? Clearly, radical scenarios are possible—but a failure to engage with
nd confront the socio-political dynamics of rapid change reduces the usefulness of a scenario exercise by obscuring critically
mportant uncertainties. Rather than focus on whether a high carbon tax or infrastructure subsidy will catalyse a transition
o a hydrogen-fuelled transport system, scenarios should perhaps also consider where and under what circumstances such
ustained political support might come about.
The point here is that rapid transition scenarios do have a place in thinking about the possible future of alternative fuelled
ehicles. But where such scenarios are used to inform policy, it should be clear that these scenarios are perhaps unlikely to
ccur in the absence of rather extreme social and political events. Scenarios that invoke only the application of policies with
 positive cost-beneﬁt ratio struggle to appear plausible if they depict such rapid change, and the developers of scenarios
epicting alternative vehicle transitions could improve scenarios by reﬂecting on the social and political implications of (or
equirements for) such rapid change.
.3. Comparison with related work
Wilson et al. (2012) compare the rates of adoption of new energy technologies in two  energy models (MESSAGE and
EMIND) with past experience. They conclude that the models have been conservative in their depiction of technology
iffusion, in contrast with the results found here. This may  be in part because the historical analogues they explored focused
n the full technology life-cycle, rather than the ﬁrst decades after market introduction. Their work thus assessed rates over
onger durations, using the t  metric derived from a logistic diffusion model. The results here are more in line with those
iscussed by Höök et al. (2012), who ﬁnd that scenarios from two studies (a set of Shell scenarios and the GET global energy
ystems optimisation model) signiﬁcantly overstate the rate at which energy transitions can be expected to take place, given
istorical precedent.
.4. ConclusionsThe analysis presented here provides important insights into plausible rates of adoption for alternative fuelled vehicles.
t should be clear that the analogies are limited in terms of their applicability to hydrogen, and the quantitative patterns
dentiﬁed are limited by data weaknesses. Furthermore, the diffusion of new technologies is not a deterministic process,
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but rather is one that is historically contingent, as has been illustrated in the overview of key aspects of each of the historic
analogies. One should therefore be careful in drawing strong conclusions about likely future rates of technology diffusion
from a set of particular, imperfect historical analogies.
Together the assembled analogies provide a coherent body of knowledge against which to assess whether the future
scenarios are consistent with what we know about change in vehicle technology choice. In this comparison, the hydrogen
futures appear to have been collectively optimistic. The historical analogies do show that rapid transitions are possible,
but none of the transitions examined faced barriers as signiﬁcant as those faced by hydrogen. The apparent optimism over
transition rates in the literature is problematic, both because much subsequent analysis is informed by depicted transitions,
and because over-optimistic expectations about transition rates can damage the chances of applying effective policy.
We conclude that those studying hydrogen futures should include more conservative projections about the rate at which
a hydrogen fuelled transportation system might emerge, alongside analysis of more optimistic scenarios. It should be clear
that this does not mean that optimistic rates have no place: rapid substitutions have happened in the past, and as Tseng
et al. (2005) have noted, the scale of energy system change envisaged in most low-carbon scenarios is such that historical
precedent cannot be used as an unequivocal guide to what is possible. Indeed, one could argue that the levels of marginal
abatement cost (and hence carbon price) that are necessary to meet emissions targets would be hugely punitive to high-
emissions vehicles, and that under such circumstances transitions to low-carbon alternatives could be as rapid as those
experienced in Brazil (which was undergoing the oil crisis and which had massive government support) or in Iran, where it
is economic sanctions that have stimulated conversions to CNG. Furthermore, current efforts to introduce hydrogen fuel cell
vehicles are the product of intensive efforts to co-ordinate industrial and policy action across many countries simultaneously,
for which no precedent appears to exist. The conclusion is therefore that optimistic and pessimistic assumptions should both
be examined, and their implications understood.
A ﬁnal conclusion relates to the focus of both innovative efforts and futures studies in hydrogen vehicle developments,
which focus almost exclusively on fuel cell vehicles. Bi-fuel and after-market conversion technologies for hydrogen internal
combustion vehicles are possible, and indeed a number of ﬁrms exist developing and promoting such technologies. These
incremental technologies are typically given short shrift in futures analysis. None of the 20 studies examined for this paper
included conversion of petrol cars to hydrogen, or explored bi-fuel vehicles that are powered by either hydrogen or petrol.
Yet the analysis here suggests that such technologies could play an important role in enabling a rapid uptake of hydrogen
fuelled vehicles. While internal combustion engines running on hydrogen are less efﬁcient than their fuel cell counterparts,
they offer a route for the fuel to be adopted more widely and more quickly. This kind of incremental technology may  be
essential in enabling proﬁtability of early refuelling infrastructure and so enabling hydrogen fuel to gain a critical mass of
market share.
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